The matter of strategic importance is Poland’s complete dependence on raw imports of energy from Russia: gas and oil. Attempts to diversify these resources were made until 2001 and then completely abandoned by the SLD government. The potential consequences of this situation were demonstrated by Russia’s recent decision to cut off gas supplies to Belarus, which automatically affected Poland. According to the vice-minister of the economy, Krzysztof Krystowski, the interruption in gas supplies on February 19 brought losses to Polish firms in the amount of $1.5 million.
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Marshall Józef Piłsudski. Painting by Wojciech Kossak. Reproduction by Paweł Makowski |
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JÓZEF DARSKI
1. Poland - Russia
Problems within Polish-Russian relations can be divided into current and geopolitical. The impossibility of their resolution results from the fact that for Russia, the economy has always been a tool of politics, in contrast to Western civilization which used political instruments to strengthen its economic position or achieve concrete economic benefits.
Currently, the first category includes conflict over Poland’s accession to the European Union and concessions which members of the EU enjoy in their trade with Russia.
Russia would like to gain a partnership and cooperation agreement linking the Union to Russia, in exchange for extending these concessions to the new EU members after May 1, and particularly its trade resolutions, as well as not only minimal economic benefits but the position of a partner of the so-called old EU, with whom it could resolve all the issues concerning the region of Central Europe over the heads of its previous vassal states.
The matter of strategic importance is Poland’s complete dependence on raw imports of energy from Russia: gas and oil. Attempts to diversify these resources were made until 2001 and then completely abandoned by the SLD government. The potential consequences of this situation were demonstrated by Russia’s recent decision to cut off gas supplies to Belarus, which automatically affected Poland. According to the vice-minister of the economy, Krzysztof Krystowski, the interruption in gas supplies on February 19 brought losses to Polish firms in the amount of $1.5 million.
Meanwhile Polish authorities caused the withdrawal of Norway from an agreement signed in 2001 which foresaw deliveries of up to 5 billion cu. m. of gas annually from 2008-2024 by way of a pipeline under the sea built by the supplier itself.
The issue of gas supplies is also connected to the problem of control over the Yamal pipeline which will in part cross Polish territory. Its owner is the joint-stock company EuRoPol GAZ, whose shareholders are: the state concern Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo (Polish Oil and Gas Extraction Company) and Russian Gazprom (each with 48 percent.) as well as the Gaz Trading company, of which 43 precent also belongs to PGNiG, 16 percent to Gazprom and 36 percent to the private company Bartimpex owned by Alekander Gudzowaty. Gudzowaty worked during communist times in Moscow for one of the Polish foreign-trade enterprises and, thanks to those contacts, made a fortune in the trade of energy resources. This share structure in Gaz Trading gives Gazprom de facto control of the Polish section of the pipeline. As early as 2001 discussions were conducted with the Russian side concerning the elimination of the company Gaz Trading and an equal division of shares in EuRoPol GAZ. In 2001 the Russian side was willing to compromise but the rise of a new left-wing government led to the abandonment of those plans. This is further proof of the strength of the pro-Russian lobby in Poland and the impossibility of pushing for the national interest.
2. Poland - Ukraine
Poland supports closer relations between Ukraine and the EU and NATO. Prime Minister Leszek Miller has repeatedly assured that Poland will be an advocate for Ukrainian interests in the West. If, however, we are talking about Ukrainian membership in NATO, those words do not always mean the same thing. Entry into the pact may mean victory for the pro-Western option or be coordinated with Russian foreign policy, particularly if Ukrainian politicians talk about entering NATO “together with Russia.” Polish politicians do not differentiate between those two positions.
Without a doubt, the most important issue is currently the launch of Caspian oil transport through Odessa to Płock and Gdańsk. The Ukrainian side, under pressure from the EU and USA, m
akes a decision to transport the oil through the Odessa-Brody pipeline (November 26, 2003 and March 18, 2004) only to choose the Russian transit route again, under the influence of Moscow (March 18, 2004). Although in January 2004 an agreement between Ukrtransnafta and Przedsiębiorstwem Eksploatacji Naftociągu Przyjaźń (Oil Pipeline Operation Enterprise) was officially concluded concerning extention of the pipeline from Brody to the Polish border and further to Płock and Gdańsk, no decision made by Kiev can be considered final. Until now nothing has been done from the Polish side either, despite the fact that two years ago President Kwaśniewski assured that the Brody-Płock connection would be ready in 2006. The problem is that such a transit route can only be used to transport Russian oil with high Sulphur content because the refinery in Płock is adjusted only to its refinement. Only the construction of a new installation in Płock or the extension of the pipeline to the terminal and refinery in Gdańsk would make the use of Caspian oil possible.
The Russian side has used a multi-faceted strategy. First, for many years it has blocked the construction of a terminal in Odessa and the Odessa-Brody pipeline. Currently, it wants to impose upon Ukraine in the opposite direction, involving the transport of Russia oil through Brody to Odessa. If that is unsuccessful, however, Russia would like to take control of the transit of Caspian oil thanks to the Baku-Noworosyjsk pipeline. The owner of the largest petroleum terminal in Odessa, with production at 15 million tones annually, is the company Eximnefteprodukt, which handles oil loading. Fifty-one percent of its shares are controlled de facto by the daughter company of Russian pipeline operator Transneft - Czernomortransneft, that directs the loading of oil in Noworosyjsk. Russian could therefore supply the Odessa-Brody pipeline with Caspian oil but from Noworosyjsk.
3. Poland – Lithuania
Poland supported the entry of Lithuania into NATO and the European Union, seeing its own strategic interest. In matters of concrete cooperation with geopolitical meaning, however, no meaningful progress has been achieved as a result of the strength of the Russian lobby that is able to block every serious undertaking in both countries. Examples include plans, discussed but never realized in the past ten years, to connect the Lithuanian system of electric energy with that of Europe through Poland, which requires the construction of an energy bridge linking both countries.
Lithuania’s national energy strategy, accepted and confirmed in 2002, claims that “a link with the Polish energy system would enable integration with the electric market of Western Europe.” Additionally, it would allow Lithuania to reduce losses resulting from interruptions in energy supplies and provide profits from transit. In 2001 a special working group proposed the construction of a high voltage line (400 kilowatts) between: Kruonis (Lithuania) - Ełk (Poland). However, sufficient resources were not set aside for the investment. The general cost of the bridge would amount to a paltry 188.5 million euro and despite this the project has not been realized until today while Lithuania remains strongly tied to the Russian energy system. Lithuanians themselves underline that there was a lack first and foremost of political will.
Disconnecting Lithuania from the former Soviet electric system would cost Russia about 1 billion euro because it would have to change its energy system in the Kaliningrad Circuit, until now connected with Lithuania. The Russia strategy is bi-level in nature. If they cannot prevent a connection between Lithuanian and European energy systems, the next step would be to gain control of and use it in order to penetrate Europe. That is why Russian concerns are trying to gain control over the Lithuanian energy market. For example, LUKoil spent $5 million on propaganda against Williams in order to pressure him out of the refinery in Możejki, meanwhile, together with United Energy Systems (RAO JESU), it transferred $6 million through the intermediary Jarij Borisowa for the election campaign of Rolandas Paksas. Gazprom bought out the Koven heat and power plant. In the meantime, JESU bought the plant in Możejki through a dependent Czech company. JESU is interested in taking advantage of the Lithuanian network to supply Western Europe by steering clear of Belarus and the Kaliningrad Circuit in electric energy, which is why is wants to take part in the construction of an electric bridge from Lithuania to Poland. In practice that would mean Russian control of the bridge.
Considering the connection of former President Paksas, it seem strange that November 21, 2003, at a moment when political scandal had emerged and preparations for instituting impeachment procedures was announced, the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski was the only politician outside the borders of Lithuania to invite and host Paksas.
On the margin we should add that the Polish minority in Lithuania supported Paksas in light of his promises to return land to Poles and other concessions in agreement with minority legislation binding in the EU.
Józef Darski
