The Eastern population of Poland fears that tightened security on the border in connection with EU requirements will lead to the disappearance of border trade and complete economic ruin. This poor corridor of Eastern Poland has made a living almost exclusively thanks to this economic activity. At the moment, statistics concerning changes in the scale of border trade after the introduction of visas is still not available. For the eastern border regions of Poland trade with Belarus and Ukraine has great significance. Resources for shopiing in Poland are to a significant extent acquired from the sale of goods carried by small-time smugglers. Largers smugglers pay bribes and cross the border without problems. Recently one-third of the employees at a border crossing were arested.
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One-rubel bank note exchanged for silver, issued in 1866 - the last issue of bank notes of the Kingdom of Poland. Photo: Janusz Rosikoń |
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One-rubel bank note exchanged for silver, issued in 1866 - the last issue of bank notes of the Kingdom of Poland. Photo: Janusz Rosikoń |
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JÓZEF DARSKI
Polish-Russian economic relations are dominated by petroleum oil.
Poles support independent Belarussian organizations.
Ukrainians want to privatize steelwork in Częstochowa.
Renewal of the Visehrad Group.
1. Poland – Russia
It is increasingly apparent that the promised offset agreement with America, in exchange for the purchase of F-16 fighters, is only a mirage. Talk of the U.S. abandonment of offset in favor of Russian and Israeli firms is getting louder. According to Prof. Jadwiga Staniszkis, this move would indicate America’s resolution of possible internal games in the EU.
This interpretation would make sense in the case of Israeli firms but it is hard to understand why a rise in Russian economic influence, and therefore political influence in Poland, would enable the U.S. to counter French-Germany policy in the Union since Russia is a partner of the former countries in conflict with the U.S.
The issue of privatization of the Lotus Group, whose structures include refineries in Gdańsk, Czechowice-Dziedzice, Gorlice and Jaśło as well as enterprises searching for oil on the Petrobaltic Baltic shelf, is still not settled. According to a new concept, a large packet of shares is to be sold on the stock market in 2005. Yukos, which would like to transport oil through Gdańsk to Western Europe, is after the purchase.
Yukos is also implementing joint investments with the Hungarian firm MOL in
Zapadno-Małobałyk in Syberia. A possible merger between the Polish petroleum concern PKN-Orlen and MOL, on which the government must decide before the end of May, would allow Yukos indirect access to the Polish market, even if its bid for Lotus was unsuccessful. Also eager to participation in the privatization of Lotus is PKN Orlen, either independently or jointly with Rotch, Yukos former partner. Plans to establish a Central European concern including the PKN Orlen – MOL combination as well as purchased firms such as Slovnaft from Slovakia, Croatian INA, Unipetrol from the Czech Republic, and Romanian Petrom as well as the aforementioned Lotus Group, may not turn out to be a counterbalance to Yukos and LUKoil, or in other words the Russian state, which has revoked the government oligarchy’s control of its energy giants, as media propaganda would have us believe. However, this is the bridge by which Russia’s influence will gain a back-door entrance into the EU.
2. Poland – Belarus
On April 28 in Warsaw the European Economic Forum was opened under the title “Europe: Expansion and Perspectives.” Belarussian Prime Minister Siarhiej Sidorski was supposed to take part in the forum but one day before his arrival, Polish military attaché Kazimierz Witaszczyk was briefly arrested in Belarus April 29, which resulted in cancellation of the visit. This was, of course, a provocation by security forces in Belarus, directly subjugated to Russia, which was not in favor of Sidorski’s visit to Warsaw.
The Polish government believes that it should still maintain contact with representatives of the Lukaszenko administration, especially at lower levels since in this way it can exert a moderate influence on the Belarussian dictatorship. Let us not forget the close to 400,000 Belarussians with Polish descent (in the vicinity of Grodzensk, Poles make up 25 percent of the population), who could be used as hostages in the hands of Lukashenko.
At the same time Polish society maintains close ties and cooperation with independent circles and non-governmental organizations in Belarus. Special Belarussian programs are implemented by the Batory Foundation, the East European Democratic Centre, the Education for Democracy Foundation (within the framework of RITA) and the Polish Robert Schuman Foundation. In Białystok (the Polish region inhabited by the Belarussian minority) the radio station Racja, launched and broadcast in Belarussian specifically for the minority, was forced to stop its activities because of $150 thousand in debts which was incurred as a result of the withdrawal of support from the Soros Foundation. Among Polish political parties, Law and Justice (PiS) cooperates with the Belarussian Peoples’ Front while Citizens’ Platform (PO) collaborates with the United Citizens’ Party.
The transit of goods through Belarus is growing annually by a mere 2-3 percent because currently a majority of carriers choose the road through the Baltic countries. This is a result of the lawlessness which dominates on the Polish-Belarussian border, where Belarussian border guards were granted the “right” by Lukashenko to confiscate any amount of goods at their own discretion. They are then sold in special state-run shops in Minsk at a price one-third below that on the market. Under these conditions transit through Belarus to Russia for Polish or EU products loses sense.
3. Poland – Ukraine
Privatization of Częstochowa Huty Stali (steel mills) became a source of conflict in Polish-Ukrainian relations. The last phase involved two strategic investors: the Donbas Industrial Union corporation, the most powerful group in the metallurgical industry in Ukraine and one of the Częstochowa’s creditors. The tender was won (exclusive right to negotiate), however, by the investor Polske Huty Stali (currently Ispat Polska Stal) Grupa LNM, even though the conditions they offered were worse than
those offered by Donbas, to which the tender commission awarded its recommendation. In Poland, however, tenders are not decided by the economic interests of the state but by officials, in this case the Ministry of the Treasury. Ukrainians accused the ministry of partiality and promised repercussions, for example in the form of interrupted supply lines. As a result of the oversight exercised by the Prime Minister’s Office in the Ministry of the Treasury responsible for the privatization, the tender was declared invalid and rescheduled exclusively for LNM and Donbas. Earlier the District Court in Częstochowa forbid the sale of Huty Stali Częstochowa to other parties in connection with the offer submitted by Donbas. The privatization issue of Huty Sali Częstochowa extends beyond Polish-Ukrainian relations since earlier the government wrote off debts in the amount of 72 million euros, the subject of an investigation by the European Commission.
For the eastern border regions of Poland trade with Belarus and Ukraine has great significance. In 1995, before the Russian crisis, Polish exports to the East amounted to approx. $6-7 billion in comparison with Eastern imports valued at $2 billion. Currently it is estimated that exports have fallen to $5 billion but the surplus remains at around $3 billion. The majority of that export takes place in border regions in the form of “suitcase” trade. Resources for shopping in Poland are to a significant extent acquired from the sale of goods carried by small-time smugglers (largers smugglers pay bribes and cross the border without problems. Recently one-third of the employees at a border crossing were arrested in connection with these charges.) The Eastern population of Poland fears that tightened security on the border in connection with EU requirements will lead to the disappearance of border trade and complete economic ruin. This poor corridor of Eastern Poland has made a living almost exclusively thanks to this economic activity. At the moment, statistics concerning changes in the scale of border trade after the introduction of visas is still not available.
4. Poland – Central Europe
The Visegrad Group, established under pressure from the U.S. in 1991, was a lifeless creation that was occasionally resuscitated. After the entry of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia to NATO and the EU, it seemed that the VG had faded into history. Meanwhile, it is only now that the chance to bring about the organization’s true existence is possible – as far as four states can truly find a common plane of interests in the EU. On May 12 members of the group adopted a new declaration during a meeting at Kromeriz Castle, which referred to a common Central European identity and the need to gain common influence on policies within the EU and conducted by the EU. It was agreed that the group will support expansion of the Union to include Eastern European countries (in practice this means Ukraine) and the Balkans (Bulgaria and Romania). Polish efforts to gain support for its position in the matter of the European Constitution were not successful and each member of the group will take a separate stand on this issue. Perhaps a more fruitful occasion for cooperation will be the EU budget for the years 2007-2013. After Poland assumes leadership of the Visegrad group in July, a meeting concerning this issue between a group of experts is to take place.
Józef Darski
