POLES IN EUROPE

Czesław Siekierski

Dr. CZESŁAW SIEKIERSKI

How do you assess Poland’s two year membership of the EU?
Two years of presence in the EU are too short a time for a thorough assessment and summing-up. Nevertheless, we must remember that the enlargement of 1 May 2006 was undoubtedly an event without precedence for Poland and Europe, as well as for global politics. The European Union expanded its population to four hundred and fifty million, whilst extending its territorial reach to the central and eastern parts of the continent as well as the Mediterranean sea-basin. The enlargement coincided with a period of slow economic growth in Western Europe. Which is why, amongst other reasons, we were faced with the pressure from older members of the EU to carry out the integration at the lowest possible cost. This had an obvious effect on the terms of EU membership negotiated by the new countries, including Poland.
It should be stressed that from the Polish perspective, the period of the last two years has not experienced any form of shock-therapy, in any social or economic sphere, despite earlier fears. It is true that some agricultural products experienced price rises even before 1 May 2004, for example sugar. But they were of a temporary nature.

Do you want to say that Poland was well prepared for her new political and economic role?
The process of Poland’s entry into the European Union required an enormous amount of work on adjustment over several years in all of the candidate countries including Poland. It was not just a matter of implementing new forms of legislation, but also putting them into effect, as well as carrying out a process of real-life adaptations in areas of technology, the environment, quality, etc. These undertakings were very costly: in some areas – mainly affecting the environment – we will be implementing them for some years to come. We were better prepared for enlargement than we and the old members of the Union originally thought. This was in relation to many sectors of industry, services, the environment and agriculture. The latter constituted over half of all the changes made to legislation. I stress this particularly, because I took part in that work in the years 2001-2003, as the then deputy minister of agriculture.
I also think that we were actually ready for integration. Proof of that is, perhaps, the very high percentage of applications for direct subsidies which has exceeded 90 percent.

One hears, every now and then, the view that the divide between the old fifteen and the new ten is still there in the EU’s internal relations?
In debates in the European forum, there is a belief in the unity of the institution. Expressions of the type “new” and “old” Union are avoided. But that does not mean that this divide is not maintained through specific undertakings. This applies, to give one example, to the method of financing. Here we do have players of different strengths. These forces may be due to national interests or may have been assembled for the purpose of achieving a tactical goal for their coalition. The domination of the Germans is noticeable in Parliament. They often find allies amongst the French. The latter have “dug themselves in” on agricultural matters, jealously guarding their interests, which means huge EU funds, and which often goes at the cost of such countries as Poland. Great Britain puts great stress on trade liberalisation, because she is an importer of agricultural and other products and wants to obtain them as cheaply as possible. This is often in conflict with the interests of other members of the EU. The Spanish demand greater spending on regional development. But this can only be at the cost of the newer, poorer countries of the EU. As you can see, coherence and solidarity are often there only in theory. Some explain this by the too short a time that we have had to “run in” the new wider Union. I explain all the above by the traditional egotism of the wealthiest older countries of the EU, who are guided mainly by their own interests.

There is still no light on the likely fate of the European Constitution Treaty?
There are two opposing views on the EU’s constitution. On the one hand, there are numerous voices suggesting that in view of the rejection of the treaty by the French and the Dutch in their referenda, the matter should be finally closed. On the other hand, clauses concerning the procedure for enacting the euro-constitution are being taken advantage of, allowing a period of reflection and consideration to be set aside. It is being used to review and, eventually, to start another ratification process, or at least to make such changes in the document, which would be accepted by all the interested parties. I would include, amongst the most important issues, the need for a considerable shortening of the euro-constitution’s text, specially those parts which sound too much like directives.

So what position should Poland take on the debate on the treaty’s future?
My position regarding the treaty has been clear right from the very beginning. I believe that the document has many faults and that we should not accept it. I also supported the idea of extending the time available for the ratification procedures. I suggested that it may be a good idea to link the referendum with local elections, to await the decisions of the other countries. Because, should it have transpired that only Poland had rejected the document, we would have been treated as the brake van of the Union. The issue became clear after the referenda in France and Holland. This does not mean that the divisions on the Polish political scene regarding the euro-constitution have not disappeared. Left of centre groups are opting for work to continue. The right is against such an approach, although the Platforma Obywatelska’s (Civic Platform) behaviour here is strange. It declares to the outside world neutral warmth for the document, while within Poland PO leaders are mostly against the treaty, fearful of losing part of their support. So, the question is still there: what next? I believe that the proposed new version of the treaty should be decidedly shorter. Some of the regulations should not be in it, because there is no need for them. The paragraphs concerning technical issues of the EU’s functioning should be separated from the part describing the aims and objectives.
Work on the draft of the European constitution should be continued for at least another 2 years, because the current text does not reflect the experiences of the new member states, including Poland. The consideration of new home truths – of benefit to the whole Union – would improve Europe’s fundamental legal act, enriching it with common consent. But at the moment, we have to deal with the two-faced diktat of the strong.

How is the implementation of the directive on services coming along? Is the liberalisation taking place in accordance with the new expectations?
Work on this issue is still under way, and is still at the legislation process stage. Discussions on the forum of the European Parliament have greatly diminished the likelihood of the liberalisation of trade in services in the EU. Access to the markets of the old Union has been limited for service providers, including those from Poland. These decisions were largely due to the influence of the Germans, or more precisely, due to the cooperation of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in Germany’s governing coalition. Both were interested in preserving the current status quo and both have huge influence on their international counterparts: the CDU on Christian democrats, and the SPD on social democrats. So while the decision was taken within the German government, the details of the directive on services were decided by German Euro MPs. We are dealing here with a classic defence of the interests of trades unions and other organisations in Western Europe against cheaper, though not worse, suppliers of services from the new countries of the EU. But please notice that those countries which did not implement such restrictions and opened their labour market widely, I am thinking here of Ireland and Great Britain, have shown that this approach has helped in putting dynamism into their economies, giving them a higher rate of GDP growth. Germans have displayed more guile here, but are losing out as a result.

Can the financial plans for the years 2007-2013 be regarded as a success or a failure for the EU?
No, it is a success in contrast to the opinions often voiced. The version proposed at the end of the British Presidency was the last one that could be accepted and which would avoid having to set an annual provisional budget. It is worth comparing the current situation with the European Commission’s original proposal for the EU’s budget for the years 2007-2013. Depending on counting methods, the difference is between 130 and 150 billion euro less. This is a testament to the crisis of values within the EU, which in its most important documents invokes the principles of assistance, cohesion, equalising opportunity and solidarity. How is it possible to achieve these aims, or talk of huge projects in the defence area, whilst at the same significantly reducing the funding of EU activities? One cannot get more of Europe with a smaller budget. Another paradox is that the members of the old EU, including Great Britain, Sweden, Austria, Holland, France, and Germany, are proposing a reduction in membership contributions, while the post-expansion structure of the EU includes countries of a much lower level of development and requiring greater support. The stance taken by the richest countries of the EU is not acceptable. I remember the negotiations in Copenhagen, where during one of the rounds we were told to reduce our demands in the area of direct subsidies, because in future we would receive funds for the development of rural areas. Today we know that the reduction for the years 2007-2013 also included funds for this objective and totaled as much as 20 billion euro.

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