POLAND - EU

The beginning of the process of the systemic transformation was accompanied by the slogan: “return to Europe”. Soon after, the idea gained more substance in the postulate of Poland’s integration with the European structures (initially the EEC, and then the EU). As early as in February 1994, the Association Agreement between Poland and EC, signed in December 1991, entered into force. Just thirteen years later, on the 1 May 2004 - 6 years after the beginning of the accession negotiations - Poland became a member of the European Union.

The idea of Poland’s accession to the European Union was met with a very positive attitude of the society already in the beginning of 1990s, at the time of its appearance in the public discourse. The public support for Poland’s entry to the EU then reached 80%. This exceptionally high support weakened during the next years, yet still the majority of the Polish society supported Poland’s membership in this organization. Undoubtedly, among the reasons for the public support for the idea of European integration were the unambiguously pro-integrationist policy of all successive governments of the III Polish Republic as well as a general support for integration of the majority of social and political elites. The EU membership was recognized as one of the Polish politically strategic goals following from the Polish nationanl interest. The extent of the influence of the unambiguously pro-integrationist policy of successive government cabinets can be illustrated by the lack of sharp difference in the support for the EU membership among people with left- or right-wing political inclinations.

The stabilization of the support was assisted by the presence of a conviction about this process being inevitable and having no alternative. A vast majority of the society saw the EU membership not just as a choice, but as an inevitability resulting from the advanced globalization processes – deepening of mutual political and economic dependences and connections between different countries. There was a common feeling that there was no coming back from Poland’s membership in the EU. Remaining out of the EU was accompanied with no less anxiety as accessing the EU, but certainly lacked the hope granted by the prospect of the membership in the community.

In the pre-accession period the support for the EU weakened, but it was also becoming much more conscious. If in the beginning it was based on the general expectations for a civilisational and cultural advancement of Poland and swift joining the community of the Western countries, in time this support was gaining a more substantive basis. The awareness of the adjustment problems connected with integration as well as the civilisational distance between Poland and EU member states was increasing. Moreover, the expectations associated with Poland’s membership in the EU became more balanced– the expected benefits were considered in a more long-term perspective, with an assumption that only the next generation of Poles will benefit from them to the fullest.

Poles entered the EU with a mixture of hopes and anxieties, not sure of what would happen after 1 May 2004. On the one hand, they hoped for the acceleration of the economic development and drop of unemployment rate (which reached 20% in 2002), on the other, they were afraid of the rise of prices and thus the worsening of living standards. Such worries began to increase dramatically in the course of the last few months before the referendum. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the voters (77,45%) supported Poland’s membership in this organization. Such considerable support in the referendum was possible on the one hand, due to the pro-integrationist attitudes which have become more consolidated. On the other hand, many Eurosceptics were convinced that it was pointless to oppose what was inevitable, and just did not turn up at the polling stations.

After the accession of Poland to the European Union Poles were relieved to see that the dark scenarios, assuming the failure of the economy as a result of EU integration, had not fulfilled, and that no dramatic changes had taken place in our country. The diminished uncertainty and reduced fears associated with the EU membership, and the following increasingly visible positive effects led to the greater support for the EU in the first few months after the accession. Two years after the accession the percentage of the supporters of the EU membership is considerably bigger than that from just before the accession. 80% of Poles declare themselves as the supporters of the Poland’s membership in the EU, whereas only 11% are opponents. This means that the public support for the EU membership today is the highest for the past 10 years.

Consolidation of the public support for Poland’s membership in the EU results predominantly from the fact that the benefits of accession are gradually becoming more visible with the passage of time. Just three months before the accession, in February 2004, the number of people believing that the accession will bring about more losses than benefits was almost the same as that of people believing in more benefits than losses. First attempts at assessment of the membership three months after the accession were better than the expectations expressed earlier. In the next months the number of people seeing more benefits than losses of our EU membership was rising. Three months after Poland’s accession to the European Union two in five Poles were convinced that the membership brought more benefits than losses, whereas today – after two years of membership – this opinion is shared by more than half of the population.

At the same time, the percentage of people negatively evaluating the membership effects was diminishing. Two years after Poland’s membership in the European Union, the number of people convinced that the EU integration brings more benefits than losses to our country is almost three times bigger than the number of people believing the contrary. (...)

Yet, although more than half of Poles see positive effects of the EU membership for our country, considerably less people declare that they personally perceive benefits of the integration. Notwithstanding this, the attitudes in this regard are becoming more positive. 2 years after the accession, the percentage of people declaring that the EU membership brought them personally more benefits than losses is almost twice as big as the number of people rather suffering from its negative effects. (...)

The EU accession boosted the economic growth in Poland. The first year of membership was already regarded as beneficial for the Polish economy. 2 years after the EU accession the positive economic effects became even more visible. Now more than half of the Polish society sees the positive influence on the state of the Polish economy (57%, 10 points more than a year ago). The evaluation of the economic effects of the membership is varied for different sectors of the economy. Contrary to earlier opinions, the sector which in the public view benefited most is the agricultural sector due to the EU system of agricultural direct subsidies.

An increasing number of people see the positive effect of integration for the functioning of business, both private and public. Yet, it does not change the fact that in the public opinion it is rather private companies (47%) that benefit from the EU membership than the public ones (32%).

Moreover, although already a year after the EU accession Poles noticed a positive effect of integration on the economy, they did not see positive changes on the labour market. Today, the number of people seeing improvement in this area is increasing. Nevertheless, the opinion that the integration has no influence on unemployment still prevails.

Unhappy about the high level of unemployment in Poland, Poles strongly value the opening of the labour markets by some of the EU member states. They consider this opportunity as one of the most important benefits of the EU membership. About a year after the EU accession, one in seven Poles declared that after the 1 May 2004 somebody from their closest family left for one of the EU countries to work there. According to polls (as well as the official statistics) the most popular destination for economic migration was Germany, where Poles were predominantly employed in seasonal jobs. The second most popular country was Great Britain. Poles are employed there in administration, marketing, hotel business and gastronomy. Relatively many Poles work in Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands. According to the statements of migrants’ families, the bulk of Poles who have migrated to the EU member states, are legally employed. Yet, the majority of persons interested in economic migration to one of the EU member states declared their readiness to work there illegally. (...)

In the public perception one of the vital positive effects of the EU membership is the improvement of the position of Poland in Europe. The increased significance of Poland in Europe after the accession to the EU is noticed by 60% of Poles. Just after joining the EU in June 2004 there were just slightly more people who considered our country to have medium position and influence than those that saw Poland among the least significant countries. At present, Poles much more commonly place Poland among the countries of medium position.

These changes were accompanied by the perception of improved attitudes of other EU states towards Poland. Two years ago, Poles were convinced that the two biggest states of the EU, France and Germany, are not welcoming towards Poland’s aspirations to play a more significant role in Europe. Both these countries were considered as unfriendly towards Poland. Such opinions were triggered by disagreements over the Constitutional Treaty as well as the Iraq intervention. In both questions Poland’s position (similarly to the position of Spain under the premiership of Aznar) was different than that of France and Germany. What we in Poland defined as independence in foreign policy, some of our EU partners interpreted as lack of loyalty and overgrown ambitions. Poles had an impression then that their country was not treated as an equal partner and that it was allowed less than the core 15 countries. Nevertheless, the growing scepticism towards the Iraq intervention, suspension of the constitution ratification process, the change of governments in Spain and Germany, the positions of the main EU countries in the budget negotiations as well as general satisfaction with the effects of the EU membership contributed to the change in the Polish perceptions of these countries. At present time, Poles find it difficult to indicate our allies in an unambiguous way, yet, no countries are perceived as obvious adversaries. More often than other countries, Polish respondents choose Germany as our ally. This shows that the basis for good Polish-German relations formed during Helmut Kohl’s chancellorship was strong enough to ensure good relations despite difference in opinions regarding EU policy as well as recurring historical debates. (...)

The focus of debates and political cleavages in Poland is shifting from support for our membership to the questions of the future shape of this organization. All significant political forces and their electorates in Poland now accept EU membership, even those who opposed it two years ago.

Poles have always agreed that the EU should be, first of all, an economic community. Satisfaction from the present effects of Poland’s membership in the Community contributes to the consolidation of support for the economic dimension of integration. Economic unity with Europe is supported by 80% of Poles. Yet, the support for political, axiological and cultural dimensions of integration grows much slower. More than half of Poles (54%) support Poland’s unification with the EU on the level of political structures, and half believe that integration should also concern people’s values and life goals. It is still a common opinion that our country should keep distinctiveness in the sphere of culture and traditions. The cultural dimension of integration is supported only by one in four Poles.

Most Poles believe that the need for the future EU enlargement warrant the necessity of institutional changes towards deeper integration of the EU member states. At the same time, Poles also believe that no country should be excluded from this process. For this reason, they reject the development of “the hard-core” or “two-speeds Europe”. The majority of Poles (57%) believe that it would be bad if there formed a group of countries cooperating closer than the rest in the EU. If, nevertheless, such a group was formed, Poland should join it (75%), in order avoid marginalization.

Considerable support is given to the formation of supranational political and military structures in the EU. More than half of Poles support the establishment of the office of Minister for foreign affairs as well as the creation of army units under the common command. Almost half of Poles believe that there should be an institution functioning as a common government in the EU. However, the idea of establishing the office of the EU president is met with rather negative reactions.

A majority of Poles has always supported the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. This fact demonstrates their understanding of the necessity of establishing legal basis for closer cooperation between member states. Public support for the European Constitution has been dominant despite reservations towards some of its provisions, especially those regarding the new voting procedures in the EU Council. Under the influence of the uncompromising position of a part of Polish political elites, Poles supported preserving the Nice system of voting, which they considered to be more beneficial for Poland. However, they also believed that blocking the agreement on the constitution may have long term negative political and economic consequences for Poland. (...)

Whole version at: www.isp.org.pl